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Abstract 
Duarte and Young (2009) decompose PIN into adjusted PIN (AdjPIN) and 
probability of trading caused by symmetric order flow shocks (PSOS). We explore 
sources of PSOS in the Korean stock market and examine the relation between 
PSOS and stock returns. Using transaction data with trader types and initiator 
information, we find that AdjPIN is not priced, while PSOS is negatively priced, a 
finding that Lai, Ng, and Zhang (2014) labeled “puzzling.” We find that the 
negative price of PSOS comes from differences of opinion among domestic 
individual investors on the significance of public news. 
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1. Introduction 
Easley and O’Hara (1992) and their subsequent papers1 propose a measurement of the probability 
of information-based trading (PIN) and empirically validate it. Duarte and Young (2009) (hereafter DY), 
however, document that the original PIN model fails to explain two well-known stylized facts in the US 
stock markets: the positive correlation between the numbers of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades, 
and the high volatilities of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades. DY suggest an adjusted PIN model 
that replaces the original PIN measure with two measures, adjusted probability of informed trading 
(AdjPIN) and probability of trading caused by symmetric order flow shocks (PSOS) arising from public 
information. 
[Insert Table 1] 
As for the Korean stock market, the existing empirical studies also raise a question of whether PIN 
is an appropriate proxy for the information risk, or whether PIN is a significant determinant of expected 
returns (see Table 1). Specifically, Eom, Kang, and Kwon (2016) report that the problems of the original 
PIN model using US data, as reported in DY, also exist in the Korean stock market, and among five 
variants of DY’s adjusted PIN model, the model without any restriction fits the Korean market data best. 
In this paper, adopting DY’s adjusted PIN model, we examine the pricing effects of PSOS. We 
mainly focus on explaining the puzzling “negative” and significant relation between PSOS and expected 
stock returns, which has been reported in the global markets except the US, by investigating the sources 
of the symmetric order flow shocks in the Korean stock market. This requires performing cross-
sectional asset pricing tests with PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS to examine whether they are priced or not. 
DY report that PSOS is positively priced in the US markets and that it seems to be a proxy for 
illiquidity.2 They document that there can be more than one possible cause for symmetric order flow 
shocks, but they do not attempt to identify the main source; the goal is to show that their inclusion of 
                                           
1 A short list of papers by Easley and O’Hara and their coauthors regarding PIN includes Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara 
and Paperman (1996), Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002, 2010), and Easley and O’Hara (2004). 
2 This role and interpretation of PSOS in the US stock market seems uncomfortable for DY. In a recent working 
paper, Duarte, Hu, and Young (2015) focus on a possible bias in the theoretical underpinning of the derivation of 
PIN. The debate on the validity of PIN has been inconclusive and is ongoing. See Section 4.1 for recent 
developments in the research on PIN. 
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systematic order flow shock in the original PIN model improves the ability to explain the data. Lai, Ng, 
and Zhang (2014) (hereafter LNZ) examine the pricing effect of informational risk based on the original 
and adjusted PIN models, using international data from 47 countries. They find that PSOS is negatively 
priced, but describe this result as “puzzling.” Therefore, the role of PSOS is important in extension of 
the PIN model, but the literature on the relation between PSOS and expected stock returns reports mixed 
results and fails to explain these results. 
The Korean stock market has distinctive features compared to the US stock market. First, the Korean 
stock market does not have designated market makers as does the US stock market. In the Korean 
market, buyers and sellers, who can submit both limit and market orders, meet via the Automated 
Trading System. Second, in the Korean stock market, most of the trading is done by individual investors. 
According to Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005), in 1998, 77.43% of the gross value of stock sales was by 
domestic individual investors, and trading by the government and corporations represents a small 
fraction of the overall trading. They also note that this feature contrasts with the results of Tesar and 
Werner (1995) in the sense that in more developed countries, foreign investors are more active traders 
than local investors. We expect that these differences between the Korean and US stock markets may 
generate a gap between the performances of the sequential trading model, such as the original and 
adjusted PIN models, in the two markets. More importantly, the dominant shock generating the 
symmetric order flow can be different, and so the pricing effect of the symmetric order flow component 
estimated from the model can be different. 
To verify the driver of the significant effects of PSOS, we pay attention to the characteristic of PSOS 
embedded in its definition, which is the trading caused by symmetric order flow shocks arising from 
difference of opinion on public news, and to the group of individual traders, who may behave as 
described in PSOS: one subgroup buys and another subgroup simultaneously sells based on the same 
public news. Our analytical procedures and results are as follows. First, following Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2002), we adopt the turnover variable (TURNOVER) as a proxy for difference of opinion, 
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which is a potential cause of symmetric order flow shocks,3 and examine the relation between PSOS 
and difference of opinion.4 We find that PSOS is highly correlated with TURNOVER, and higher PSOS 
firms show higher increase of difference of opinion (TURNOVER) when there is public news that may 
lead to differing conclusions among investors. These results indicate that difference of opinion is the 
cause of the symmetric order flow shocks in the Korean market. 
Next, to examine how difference of opinion affects the cross-sectional results of PSOS, we perform 
cross-sectional regressions with TURNOVER. We subtract the component related to TURNOVER from 
PSOS, then examine whether the residual remains significant. We find that the residual is not significant, 
which means that the component related to TURNOVER drives the negative and significant coefficients 
of PSOS. 
Finally, we decompose TURNOVER into three components—the trading activity of domestic 
institutional (INTA), domestic individual (RNTA), and foreign investors (FNTA)—and investigate 
whether the trading activity of individual investors is the main contributor of the explanatory power of 
PSOS. Among these three variables, we focus on the trading activity of individual investors, because 
there is a belief that individual investors are uninformed noise traders (Kumar and Lee, 2006; Baber 
and Odean, 2008; and Baber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009), who may draw different conclusions from public 
news. We find that individual investors show an increase in the numbers of both buys and sells and 
TURNOVER in response to public news, and this increase is larger for higher PSOS firms. These results 
show that individual investors generate symmetric order flow shocks because of difference of opinion. 
We subtract the component related to INTA from PSOS and construct an orthogonalized PSOS variable 
                                           
3 As DY document, there can be more than one cause for symmetric order flow shocks, and the main cause may 
affect the cross-sectional performance of PSOS. 
4 Turnover is used as a proxy for difference of opinion and is documented to be negatively related to expected 
returns (Harris and Raviv, 1993; Vega, 2006). Hwang, Lee, Lim, and Park (2013) also find the positive relation 
between PSOS and turnover, but they describe this result as “somewhat unexpected” and explain that this positive 
relation is because turnover is a noisy proxy of liquidity (footnote 15 on page 156). We interpret turnover as a 
proxy of difference of opinion following Diether et al. (2002). 
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from the residuals; we repeat this process using RNTA instead of INTA.5 We find that only RNTA 
contributes to the cross-sectional explanatory power of PSOS. 
We use transaction data with information on the trade initiator and the trader type (domestic 
individual, domestic institution, or foreigner) from 2001 to 2006 in the Korean stock market. In the 
related literature, the failure of the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to specify the trade initiator is 
shown to be problematic (Elis, Michaely, and O’Hara, 2000; Asquith, Oman, and Safaya, 2010; Hwang 
et al., 2013). Hwang et al. (2013) report that the asset pricing results of PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS are 
sensitive to this failure of the Lee and Ready algorithm. Our data contain precise information on the 
trade initiator as in Hwang et al. (2013), thus generating clean empirical asset pricing results. 
We show that PSOS is negatively priced when the main source of the symmetric order flow shocks 
is difference of opinion. Our results suggest that the proportion of the trader group generating the 
symmetric order flow shock in a market can explain the differing performance of PSOS across markets. 
Further research in other markets will be necessary to clarify the effect of the main source of symmetric 
order flow shocks on the explanatory power of PSOS on expected stock returns. Moreover, this paper 
contributes to the literature on the role of individual investors in asset pricing. Individual investors are 
generally regarded as noise or uninformed traders, so the question of how they affect stock prices has 
been actively investigated. Kumar and Lee (2006) report that systematic noise trading of individual 
investors can affect stock prices, using a measure of individual investor order imbalance. They insist 
that systematic noise trading causes limits to arbitrage and makes stocks overpriced, and consequently 
reduces future returns. According to Miller (1977), prices reflect more optimistic valuations if 
pessimistic investors are constrained by short-sale costs, and this overvaluation will lower future returns. 
We present evidence that individual investors generate symmetric order flow shocks because of 
differing opinions on the meaning of public news, and their trading activity leads to lower future returns. 
The symmetric order flow shocks caused by difference of opinion on news can be interpreted as noise 
                                           
5 We find that INTA and RNTA are negatively related to expected stock returns, while FNTA is not. We regard 
INTA and RNTA as the components of TURNOVER that may contribute to the negative coefficient of PSOS, thus 
we examine the effects of INTA and RNTA but not FNTA on the explanatory power of PSOS.  
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trading, resulting in limits to arbitrage, so our results can be interpreted as consistent with Kumar and 
Lee (2006). 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology of 
variable construction and overall analysis. Section 3 briefly introduces the original and adjusted PIN 
models. Section 4 presents the results of the model estimation and asset pricing tests. Section 5 describes 
our conclusions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
Our sample includes all stocks in the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). To estimate the 
structural models on market microstructure, our sample period is restricted to 2001–2006, due to the 
availability of relevant intraday transaction data with trader type. Our data contain a time-ordered record 
of every stock transaction on the Korea Exchange (KRX) and information regarding the types and order 
numbers of buyers and sellers, which enables us to clearly identify the initiator of each trade without 
employing the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, which is reported to have misclassification problems 
(Odders-White, 2000; Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara, 2000; Asquith et al., 2010; Chakrabarty, Moulton, 
and Shkilko, 2012). We define the initiator of a trade as the trader who placed his/her order later than 
the other among the buyer and seller, following the chronological definition of Odders-White (2000).6 
Using the order submission number of the buyer and seller of each transaction, we can figure out who 
placed the order later. 
[Insert Table 2] 
                                           
6 Odders-White (2000) describes the initiator of a transaction as the person who caused the transaction to occur, 
and thus defines an initiator is a trader who placed his or her order last, chronologically. Our data provide the 
order submission numbers of the buyer and seller of each transaction, so we can figure out who placed the order 
later. However, most of data sets used in many empirical studies do not provide the order submission numbers of 
the buyer and seller, so using this method is not available. Odders-White (2000) evaluate the accuracy of the Lee 
and Ready (1991) algorithm by comparing the initiator determined by the algorithm and the true initiator 
determined by the order submitted time. The order submission number in our data can be a substitute of the order 
submitted time in the data of Odders-White to determine the true initiator who placed the order last, thus we 
document in our paper that we can clearly identify the initiator of each trade without employing the Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm. In the literature, many studies find the true initiator of a transaction in the same way and examine 
the errors from using the algorithm (Aitken and Frino, 1996; Finucane, 2000; Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000; Hwang 
et al., 2013). 
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Table 2 shows a part of our data on January 12th, 2004. Each row provides information about one 
transaction, including a transaction price, number of shares traded, and the time the transaction 
completed. The 8th and 9th columns present the order submission number of the buyer and seller of the 
given transaction, respectively. We determine the initiator of each transaction using this information. 
For example, the first transaction for the firm code 7160 shows that the buyer’s order number is 184 
and the seller’s order number is 151. It indicates that the seller submitted the order first, and then the 
buyer completed the transaction by submitting the order after the seller. Thus, we assign the buyer as 
the initiator of this transaction. In case of the second and third transactions, we can see that the order 
submission number of sellers in these two transactions are the same as 276. It indicates that his/her sell 
order is completed with two different buyers, one with the order number 185 and the other one with the 
order number 260. In both transactions, the seller initiates them. 
Hwang et al. (2013) document that the misclassification problem of the Lee and Ready algorithm 
brings about biases in the estimates of PIN such that the empirical tests of PIN can be distorted seriously. 
Our data avoid this problem and provide estimates of PIN-related measures free from the 
misclassification problem. 
Our data also provide information about whether a buyer or a seller is an individual, institutional, or 
foreign investor. Using this trader type information, we compare each group’s trading pattern with the 
structural order flow of the models in Section 4.3. Since information about trader type is not available 
in general, many studies proxy trader type by trade size (Hvidkjaer, 2008; Barber et al., 2009), but Lee 
and Radhakrishna (2000) document that there are errors using trade size as a proxy for trader type in 
the US market. Since our data set provides accurate information, our research is free from the trader 
type identification issue. 
Our analyses also require us to use monthly and daily financial data; these are provided by 
DataGuide and the Korean Research Data Service (KRDS). To construct market beta, turnover, Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure, and other control variables, we use monthly and daily data, including return 
and volume provided by DataGuide. The turnover measure (TURNOVER) is the annual average of daily 
turnover. For the Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ), we compute the annual average of daily price 
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impact of trading volume. We estimate market beta as follows: first, for each firm–month, we estimate 
market loadings using 60 months of past data. We then form 10 portfolios based on these pre-ranking 
factor loadings. Using the returns from these portfolios, we estimate the full period beta for each 
portfolio and assign this beta to each firm in the portfolio. For firm size and book-to-market ratio, we 
collect the market value of firms in December and the book value of firms in June for each year from 
KRDS. In each year, we exclude firms that do not have market capitalization data in December of the 
previous year. 
 
3. The PIN Model and Its Extension 
Easley and O’Hara’s (1992) sequential trade model provides a measure of the probability of 
informed trades captured by order imbalance. Their model assumes that informed traders buy (sell) 
stocks when they receive positive (negative) private information and they do not trade if there is no 
information. Noise traders do not have any private information and they buy and sell regardless of the 
existence of private information in the market. Their model has been extended by many studies, and in 
this paper, we employ the Easley et al. (1996) model as the original PIN model. The original PIN is 
defined as follows: 
 
𝑃𝐼𝑁 =
𝑎 × 𝑢
𝑎 × 𝑢 + 𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠
 (1) 
where 𝑎 is the probability that a private information event occurs at the beginning of a day, 𝑢 is the 
daily arrival rate of orders from informed traders, and 𝜀𝑏 and 𝜀𝑠 are daily arrival rates of buy and sell 
orders from noise traders, respectively. 
In the US stock market, DY document that the original PIN model does not fit the data well, and thus 
they suggest the adjusted PIN model as a solution to the problems of the original model. For the adjusted 
PIN model, DY extend the original model by adding the symmetric order flow shocks that cause buy 
and sell trades simultaneously. Put concretely, DY replace the original PIN by following two measures: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑃𝐼𝑁 =
𝑎 × (𝑑 × 𝑢𝑏 + (1 − 𝑑) × 𝑢𝑠)
𝑎 × (𝑑 × 𝑢𝑏 + (1 − 𝑑) × 𝑢𝑠) + (∆𝑏 + ∆𝑠) × (𝑎 × 𝜃′ + (1 − 𝑎) × 𝜃) + 𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠
 (2) 
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𝑃𝑆𝑂𝑆 =
(∆𝑏 + ∆𝑠) × (𝑎 × 𝜃
′ + (1 − 𝑎) × 𝜃)
𝑎 × (𝑑 × 𝑢𝑏 + (1 − 𝑑) × 𝑢𝑠) + (∆𝑏 + ∆𝑠) × (𝑎 × 𝜃′ + (1 − 𝑎) × 𝜃) + 𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠
 (3) 
where 𝑎 is the probability that a private information event occurs at the beginning of a day; 𝑢𝑏 and 
𝑢𝑠 are the daily arrival rate of buy and sell orders from informed traders, respectively; 𝜀𝑏 and 𝜀𝑠 are 
daily arrival rates of buy and sell orders from noise traders, respectively; and 𝜃 and 𝜃′ are the 
probability that a symmetric order flow shock occurs conditional on the arrival of private information 
and absence of private information, respectively. In the event of a symmetric order flow shock, the daily 
arrival rates of buys and sells are ∆𝑏 and ∆𝑠, respectively. 
Eom et al. (2016) show that the original PIN model exhibits exactly the same problems in the Korean 
stock market that DY pointed in the US market, and suggest that, among the five variants of DY adjusted 
PIN model, the unrestricted version fits best in the Korean market.7 We employ this unrestricted version 
in this paper. We estimate the adjusted PIN model by the maximum likelihood method following DY 
and Eom et al. (2016).8 The aggregated daily number of buys and sells are used for estimation, and in 
each firm–year, we maximize the likelihood with 50 different, randomly chosen, starting points. Then, 
the maximum of these 50 maximization results is chosen as our final results. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the percentile of summary statistics on the buyer- and seller- initiated trades 
and Panel B shows the estimation results of the adjusted PIN model.9 Our data include 3,774 firm-year 
observations, indicating an annual average of 629 firms. 10  Consistent with DY’s, the correlation 
                                           
7 DY employ Model 4 which has a restriction that the probabilities of the symmetric order flow shock conditional 
on the arrival of private information and absence of private information are the same (𝜃 = 𝜃′). In this paper, we 
employ Model 5, the unrestricted model allowing 𝜃 ≠ 𝜃′. 
8 The likelihood function of the extended model is 
𝐿(𝜃|𝐵, 𝑆) = (1 − 𝑎)(1 − 𝜃)𝑒−𝜀𝑏
𝜀𝑏
𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−𝜀𝑠
𝜀𝑠
𝑆
𝑆!
+ (1 − 𝑎)𝜃𝑒−(𝜀𝑏+∆𝑏)
(𝜀𝑏+∆𝑏)
𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−(𝜀𝑠+∆𝑠)
(𝜀𝑠+∆𝑠)
𝑆
𝑆!
+
𝑎(1 − 𝜃′)(1 − 𝑑)𝑒−𝜀𝑏
𝜀𝑏
𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−(𝜀𝑠+𝑢𝑠)
(𝜀𝑠+𝑢𝑠)
𝑆
𝑆!
+ 𝑎𝜃′(1 − 𝑑)𝑒−(𝜀𝑏+∆𝑏)
(𝜀𝑏+∆𝑏)
𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−(𝜀𝑠+𝑢𝑠+∆𝑠)
(𝜀𝑠+𝑢𝑠+∆𝑠)
𝑆
𝑆!
+
𝑎(1 − 𝜃′)𝑑𝑒−(𝜀𝑏+𝑢𝑏)
(𝜀𝑏+𝑢𝑏)
𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−𝜀𝑠
𝜀𝑠
𝑆
𝑆!
+ 𝑎𝜃′𝑑𝑒−(𝜀𝑏+∆𝑏+𝑢𝑏)
(𝜀𝑏+∆𝑏+𝑢𝑏)
𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−(𝜀𝑠+∆𝑠)
(𝜀𝑠+∆𝑠)
𝑆
𝑆!
  
where B and S are the number of buys and sells for a given day and 𝜃 = (𝑎, 𝑢𝑏 , 𝑢𝑠, 𝜀𝑏 , 𝜀𝑠, 𝑑, 𝜃, 𝜃
′, ∆𝑏 , ∆𝑠) is the 
parameter vector. The original PIN model can be regarded as a restricted model with restrictions 𝑢𝑏 = 𝑢𝑠 and 
𝜃 = 𝜃′ = ∆𝑏= ∆𝑠= 0. 
9 Panel A (Panel B) of Table 3 in this paper and Panel A of Table 1 (Panel B of Table 3) in Eom et al. (2016) are 
exactly the same, because both papers use the same market data with the same sample periods. 
10 Since our data include 3,774 firm-year observations, each parameter has a sample of 3,774 estimates. We report 
the 5th, 25th, 50th (median), 75th, and 95th percentile of 3,774 observations for each parameter in Panel B of Table 
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between buys and sells is mostly positive, which contradicts the non-positive restriction of the original 
PIN model. Though we do not report the moments of buys and sells implied by the original PIN model, 
the variances of buys and sells computed from the data are also much larger than the implied moments. 
The median of the implied variance of buys (sells) is 19.88 (29.34) while the median of the variance of 
buys (sells) is 36.84 (64.35). We observe that the values of parameters determining the arrival rates, 
such as 𝑢𝑏 , 𝑢𝑠, 𝜀𝑏 , 𝜀𝑠, ∆𝑏 , and ∆𝑠 are much smaller than those in the US markets reported by DY. It is 
possible that the US market has the higher levels of buy and sell trades than the Korean market. 
In cross-sectional regressions, we include market beta (Beta), the log of market value of firm equity 
at the end of the previous year (log(ME)), the log of book value divided by market value for the previous 
year (log(BM))11, and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (ILLIQ), which is the annual average of 
daily price impact. We report the summary statistics for these variables in Panel C of Table 3. Our 
sample data are not concentrated in the group with a specific characteristic. The differences in the 
minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of each variable suggest that there is sufficient cross-
correlation variation in our sample. For example, the minimum value of log(ME) is 1.80 and the 
maximum value of it is 18.39. Its mean and standard deviation are 11.07 and 1.62, respectively, 
suggesting that our data are not concentrated in small firms. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Asset pricing tests of PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS 
In this section, we perform cross-sectional analysis with PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS. We focus on the 
pricing effect of AdjPIN and PSOS, but we also test the pricing effect of PIN for comparison. 
 [Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 shows that PIN and AdjPIN are not significantly priced. Our data provide error-free estimates 
of the original and adjusted PIN models, so we expect that these insignificant results are not derived by 
                                           
3. 
11 The book-to-market ratio (log(BM)) values greater than the 0.95 fractile or less than the 0.05 fractile are set to 
equal the 0.95 and 0.05 fractile values, respectively. 
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the error of PIN and AdjPIN. The insignificant results of PIN and AdjPIN are consistent with DY, LNZ, 
and other literature. The relevant literature reports that information risk is diversifiable and can be 
regarded as an idiosyncratic risk, so it is not priced (Hughes, Liu, and Liu, 2007; Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia, 2007). Hughes et al. (2007) suggest that information risk is either diversifiable or embodied 
in existing risk factors, and Lambert et al. (2007) also report that information risk is diversifiable. On 
the other hand, the existing literature suggests concerns on the validity of the PIN measure. Aktas, de 
Bodt, Declerck, and Oppens (2007) examine the behavior of PIN around merger and acquisition 
announcements that took place in the Euronext Paris, and report evidence of contradictory behaviors of 
PIN. These results raise the question of whether PIN is a valid measure capturing the information risk.12 
Akay, Cyree, Griffiths, and Winters (2012) examine what PIN measures in the T-bill market and find 
that it is possibly related to liquidity-based trading instead of information-based trading. Hence, our 
insignificant results of PIN and AdjPIN are in the spirit of the growing debate on the validity of PIN. 
Most importantly, PSOS has significant and negative coefficients. ILLIQ has a positive and 
significant coefficient in Model 6, indicating that there exists an illiquidity premium but it becomes 
insignificant if PSOS is included. The coefficient of PSOS, however, remains significant even though 
ILLIQ is included. This indicates that PSOS is not simply an illiquidity measure, as DY insist. 
Our results that PIN and AdjPIN are not significant, and that PSOS is negatively priced and not 
affected by the illiquidity measure, are not surprising. LNZ report consistent findings in 47 countries, 
but they leave these results unexplained. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we focus on the meaning of PSOS in 
the Korean market and verify why PSOS is negatively priced. 
 
4.2 PSOS and difference of opinion 
                                           
12 Much research from three distinct directions has raised questions on the credibility of the PIN measure. The 
first is related to the fact that PIN contradicts the empirical stylized facts, especially in event studies (e.g., see 
Duarte and Young, 2009; Petchey, Wee, and Yang, 2016). The second is related to problems such as numerical 
overflow and so-called time-horizon issues which arise in the estimation of PIN (e.g., see Easley, Engle, O’Hara, 
and Wu, 2008; Tay, Ting, Tse, and Warachka, 2009; Lin and Ke, 2011). The third is related to the bias in the 
theoretical underpinnings of PIN (e.g., see Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015; Duarte et al., 2015; Back, Crotty, and 
Li, 2016). 
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We employ the turnover measure as a proxy for difference of opinion following Diether et al. (2002), 
and examine whether PSOS is significantly associated with the turnover variable. PSOS is defined as 
the ratio of the expected number of trades caused by the symmetric order flow shock to the total 
expected number of trades. DY note that there are at least two possible explanations for symmetric order 
flow shocks. One possible cause is that traders coordinate on trading on a certain day to reduce trading 
costs as Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest. In addition, DY suggest the occurrence of a public news 
event whose implications traders disagree as another possible cause. In other words, when heterogeneity 
among investors increases, symmetric order flow can occur. These two possible explanations provide 
implications for the relation between symmetric order flow and different aspects of liquidity. The first 
explanation suggests that symmetric order flow occurs with one aspect of liquidity in terms of the 
smaller price impact. The other explanation, however, suggests that symmetric order flow occurs with 
liquidity improvement, which is the larger trading volume but not directly related to the smaller price 
impact. Thus, we employ stock turnover (TURNOVER) to capture the disagreement effect and the 
Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ) to account for the price impact, and then explore the two above 
explanations by examining the relations between PSOS and the two measures. 
To explore this issue, we first compute correlations among PIN, AdjPIN, PSOS, ILLIQ, TURNOVER, 
and other related variables. 
[Insert Table 5] 
In Table 5, contrary to DY’s results, PSOS has a negative correlation with ILLIQ, which indicates 
that it is not appropriate to interpret PSOS as an illiquidity measure in the Korean market, but PSOS has 
a positive and more significant correlation with TURNOVER. This suggests that PSOS is a proxy for 
difference of opinion, as expected. 
To explore the relation between PSOS and difference of opinion, we perform two analyses. First, we 
sort firms into quintiles based on their PSOS, and then investigate changes in the number of buys and 
sells and TURNOVER when public news is announced. We regard the news announcement as the event 
causing disagreement among investors. Second, we perform cross-sectional analysis with TURNOVER. 
We verify whether TURNOVER affects the predictive power of PSOS. 
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In each year t, we sort firms into quintiles based on their PSOS estimated in the previous year. For 
each quintile portfolio, we calculate the average of annual PIN-related measures, PIN, AdjPIN, and 
PSOS, and then average number of buys (BUYS) and sells (SELLS), average net order imbalance (IMB), 
average value of ILLIQ, and average value of TURNOVER on event and non-event days, respectively. 
If the symmetric order flow is caused by difference of opinion, then the high PSOS portfolio will show 
an increase in the number of buys and sells when public news is announced. More directly, the high 
PSOS portfolio will also show increased difference of opinion, which is measured by TURNOVER, in 
response to the news. As public news that may cause disagreement among investors, we use fair 
disclosure announced on the Korea Exchange.13 Since the fair disclosure rule was implemented in 
November 2002, for this analysis, we restrict the sample period to 2003–2006. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 presents the trading activity of each PSOS quintile on event and non-event days, respectively. 
As PSOS increases, PIN does not show a big difference across portfolios, while AdjPIN deacreases. 
These patterns are consistent with the results in Table 5 that PIN is weakly correlated with PSOS and 
AdjPIN is negatively correlated with PSOS. Except for the lowest PSOS quintile, all portfolios show an 
increase in the number of buys and sells on event days. The pattern of IMB shows that, as PSOS 
increases, the relative increase of SELLS is larger than that of BUYS. In Table 3, the estimated values of 
∆𝑠 are higher than those of ∆𝑏, thus the larger increase of SELLS in high PSOS firms seems to be 
consistent with the model. The increase of TURNOVER in the highest PSOS quintile is three times that 
in the lowest quintile. TURNOVER of the lowest PSOS quintile changes from 0.012 to 0.014, while that 
of the highest quintile changes from 0.038 to 0.044. This indicates that the increase in difference of 
opinion in response to public news is larger in higher PSOS firms. Overall results in Table 6 support 
our hypothesis. 
Next, we perform the cross-sectional analysis with TURNOVER, and investigate whether the 
significant coefficient of PSOS is attributed to difference of opinion. In the literature, the role of 
                                           
13 All fair disclosures can be collected from the Korea Exchange website (httep://kind.krx.co.kr). 
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heterogeneous beliefs among investors in predicting the cross-section of stock returns has been an 
important issue. Miller (1977) introduces a theoretical model in which prices reflect more optimistic 
valuation if pessimistic investors are constrained in trading due to short-sale costs, and this 
overvaluation produces negative future returns. The higher disagreement among investors produces 
lower future returns according to Miller’s model. Diether et al. (2002) and Boehme, Danielsen, and 
Sorescu (2006) find empirical evidence of overvaluation of high dispersion stocks under short-sale 
constraints. If PSOS is a proxy of difference of opinion as in our hypothesis, then the negative 
coefficients will be attributed to the component related to difference of opinion.  
[Insert Table 7] 
In Table 7, the negative coefficients of TURNOVER are significant even after controlling for PSOS 
and ILLIQ. By contrast, PSOS loses its predictive power if TURNOVER is included. These features 
provide further evidence that the difference in opinion among investors is behind the negative relation 
between PSOS and expected stock returns. 
To examine more precisely the effect of TURNOVER and to compare it with that of ILLIQ, we 
construct two variables, AdjPSOS1 and AdjPSOS2. AdjPSOS1 (AdjPSOS2) is an adjusted PSOS 
measure that is orthogonal to ILLIQ (TURNOVER). In each month, we regress PSOS on ILLIQ 
(TURNOVER) and then subtract the component related to ILLIQ (TURNOVER) from PSOS. The sum 
of the intercept and residual is defined as AdjPSOS1 (AdjPSOS2). We expect the coefficients of 
AdjPSOS1 and AdjPOS2 to become insignificant if the eliminated part plays an essential role to be 
priced. 
Model 4 examines whether PSOS, after the illiquidity effect is controlled, has an explanatory power 
for expected stock returns. The coefficient of AdjPOS1 in Model 4 is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level, which shows that the significant effect of PSOS is not driven 
by the illiquidity component. On the other hand, in Models 5 and 6, examining whether the PSOS effect 
survives after controlling TURNOVER, the coefficients of AdjPSOS2 are not statistically significant 
even at the 10% significance level. Overall, these results show that PSOS is negatively priced due to 
the component related to the difference of opinion (TURNOVER), not due to the illiquidity component. 
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As DY document, there can be more than one cause of symmetric order flow shocks. The dominant 
cause in the market can differ across markets and thus derive different meanings of PSOS. In the 
literature, however, the cause of symmetric order flow shocks is left unexplained. In the Korean market, 
PSOS seems to be a proxy for difference of opinion, which explains the negative relation between PSOS 
and stock returns. Our empirical results shed light on this important issue, but further research on the 
causes of symmetric order flow in other countries is needed. 
 
4.3 Difference of opinion among individual investors  
We investigate whether the trading of individual investors is the main contributor of the predictive 
power of PSOS. Difference of opinion can be regarded as a response by uninformed traders to public 
news. Among various types of investors – domestic institutional, domestic individual, and foreign 
investors ― we focus on individual traders for two reasons. First, individual investors are regarded as 
noise traders or uninformed traders in the literature (Kumar and Lee, 2006; Barber and Odean, 2008; 
Barber et al., 2009). This indicates that they potentially have different implications with regard to public 
news, because of the lack of accurate information. Second, one of the notable features in the Korean 
market is that there is a large proportion of individual investors trading in the market (Choe, Kho, and 
Stulz, 1999; Kang, Kwon, and Sim, 2013). The effect of their trading on the Korean market can be 
greater than that in other markets. Thus, we hypothesize that individual investors are the main group of 
traders generating the symmetric order flow because of difference of opinion; thus they are the main 
contributor of the significant relation between PSOS and expected returns. 
First, we investigate the correlation of each trader group’s buys and sells. In the adjusted PIN model, 
informed traders participate in only one side following their information, if there is an occurrence of 
private information; thus the correlation of their buys and sells is negative. On the other hand, the 
symmetric order flow contributes to both sides if there is a shock in the market; thus, the correlation of 
buys and sells is positive in this case. As we hypothesize, if individual investors are those who have 
heterogeneous beliefs and generate the symmetric order flow, then their buys and sells will have a 
positive correlation. 
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Our intraday data provide information about the types of buyers and sellers—whether they are 
institutional, individual, or foreign investors. For each day, we aggregate the number (volume) of buys 
and sells of each investor group, and then compute the time-series average of annual correlations of 
daily buys and sells.  
[Insert Table 8] 
In Table 8, the individual investor’s buys and sells are highly correlated. In terms of number of buys 
and sells (nbuy and nsell), the correlation of individual investors is 0.800, which is notably higher than 
that of other groups, 0.121 and 0.120, and it is the only significant result. We can see the consistent 
results in terms of volume (vbuy2 and vsell2). This means that individual investors tend to buy and sell 
simultaneously on a given day, similar to the symmetric order flow of the adjusted PIN model. In other 
words, these results suggest that symmetric order flow can be closely related to the trading of individual 
investors. 
To investigate further the relation between PSOS and trading of individual investors, we construct a 
measure to capture the level of trades of each investor group on a given stock. By modifying the 
measures of Kumar and Lee (2006) and Han and Kumar (2013), we define the relative trading activity 
(or concentration) of a given investor group as a normalized number of shares traded by them (NTA) as 
follows. 
𝑅𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
× 103 (4) 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
× 103 (5) 
𝐹𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
× 103 (6) 
We compute the annual average of those daily NTA measures. As TURNOVER is the ratio of total 
trading shares to total number of shares outstanding, these three NTA measures as components of 
TURNOVER14 and figure out the main contributor of the predictive power of PSOS by comparing the 
effects of these three measures on PSOS. 
                                           
14 In principle, the sum of RNTA, INTA, and FNTA should be TURNOVER. As described in Section 3, however, 
intraday trade data are filtered following DY. 
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First, we examine the correlations of NTA and PIN-related measures. There is a belief that foreign 
and institutional investors are relatively more informed than retail investors, but some of the literature 
shows evidence inconsistent with this belief. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) document that foreign 
investors in the Korean stock market are not informationally advantaged compared with domestic 
investors. Thus, we do not expect high correlation of PIN or AdjPIN with any specific trader group, but 
we expect PSOS and the individual trader group to be highly correlated. As we suggest, if the trading 
of individual investors is closely related to the symmetric order flow, then PSOS will be highly 
correlated with RNTA. The time-series average of the annual correlation among NTA measures and other 
key variables is reported in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9] 
In Table 9, PIN and AdjPIN do not show the highly positive correlation with any specific trader 
group. By contrast, PSOS appears to be highly correlated with RNTA (0.388). INTA and FNTA also have 
positive correlations with PSOS (0.099 and 0.177, respectively), but the levels and significance of 
correlations are much smaller than RNTA. Overall, we confirm that PSOS is highly correlated with the 
trading of individual investors. 
To investigate whether the trading of individual investors is caused by difference of opinion, we 
revisit the analysis in Section 4.2. In each year t, we sort firms into quintiles based on the firms’ PSOS 
estimated in the previous year. For each quintile portfolio, we calculate each investor group’s average 
number of buys and sells on event and non-event days, respectively. 
[Insert Table 10] 
In Table 10, all trader groups show increases in buys and sells on event days in general, but the size 
of increase in buys and sells across PSOS quintiles shows different patterns. Institutional and foreign 
investors show an almost U-shaped pattern in changes in buys and sells, as PSOS increases, but 
individual investors produce an almost monotonically increasing pattern in buys and sells on news days. 
These results suggest that, among three types of investors, domestic individual investors play an 
important role in generating the symmetric order flow. 
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Next, we perform the cross-sectional analysis to examine whether trading of individual investors is 
the main contributor of the pricing effect of PSOS. Among three components of TURNOVER, and we 
expect that RNTA is the key component driving the negative pricing effect of PSOS. 
[Insert Table 11] 
In Table 11, Models 1 to 3 examine the predictive power of each investor group’s trading, 
respectively. INTA and RNTA are negatively priced. In Models 4 to 6, we examine the significance of 
PSOS after controlling for NTA measures. The results show that the coefficient of PSOS becomes 
insignificant only if RNTA is controlled while INTA does not reduce the significance of PSOS. This 
indicates that RNTA and INTA are negatively priced for different reasons, and the effect of PSOS is 
related only to that of RNTA, not INTA. 
Moreover, we construct AdjPSOS3 (AdjPSOS4) variable that is an adjusted PSOS measures 
orthogonal to INTA (RNTA) as AdjPSOS1 and AdjPSOS2 in Section 4.2. Model 7 shows that the 
explanatory power of PSOS, after controlling for INTA, is still negatively significant. This means that 
RNTA is the key component of TURNOVER that contributes to the negative relation between PSOS and 
expected returns. Model 8 examines whether PSOS, after controlling for RNTA, has explanatory power 
for expected returns. This model shows that the explanatory power of PSOS is substantially reduced by 
removing the component related to RNTA. The coefficient of AdjPSOS4 is significant only under the 
10% confidence level. 
To summarize, we find that domestic individual investors generate symmetric order flow because of 
difference of opinion and that their trading is the main contributor of the pricing effect of PSOS. As we 
previously find that PSOS is closely related to TURNOVER, in this section we decompose TURNOVER 
into three trading activity measures, and show that the trading of individual investors contributes to the 
negative coefficient of PSOS, while others do not. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We use transaction data including trader type in the Korean stock market, mainly to examine what 
drives the significant relation between PSOS and expected returns. To accomplish this, we first perform 
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asset pricing tests with PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS, and find that PSOS is significantly priced while AdjPIN 
is not. Focusing on the explanatory power of PSOS, we investigate the main cause of symmetric order 
flow and why PSOS is negatively related to expected returns. We show that PSOS is not a proxy of 
illiquidity, but PSOS is closely related to TURNOVER, which is a proxy for difference of opinion. Then, 
we decompose TURNOVER into three components ― the trading activity measures of institutional, 
individual, and foreign investors ― and find that the trading of individual investors significantly 
contributes to the explanatory power of PSOS, while other components do not. 
Our results show that PSOS can be negatively priced when the dominant cause of symmetric order 
flow shocks is difference of opinion. DY construct the adjusted PIN model and find that PSOS is 
positively priced as a proxy of illiquidity in the US stock market, but they do not clarify the cause of 
the symmetric order flows. Using data from 47 countries, LNZ find that PSOS is negatively priced, but 
they leave this finding unexplained. 
The Korean stock market has distinctive features compared to the US stock market. First, the Korean 
stock market does not have designated market makers as in the US stock market. In the Korean market, 
buyers and sellers, who can submit both limit and market orders, meet via the Automated Trading 
System. Second, in the Korean stock market, most of the trading is done by individual investors. In this 
paper, we put more weight on the second distinctive feature, which is a different composition of 
investors in the market, deriving the different pricing effects of PSOS. Considering that the Korean 
stock market and other emerging markets have a larger proportion of the individual investors than the 
US stock market, our results may imply that in the market with a large proportion of individual investors, 
or uninformed noise traders, the dominant symmetric order flow shock can be difference of opinion, 
and thus the symmetric order flow component is negatively priced. Our paper sheds light on this 
important issue, but requires further research in other markets to clarify the effect of the main cause of 
symmetric order flow shocks to the explanatory power of PSOS on expected stock returns.  
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Table 1. Findings from PIN models in the Korean stock markets  
This table presents the previous findings on the performance of the PIN models in the Korean stock markets.  
Authors Sample period Findings 
Choe and Yang (2006) January 2002 to March 2002 
PIN shows little correlations with other measures for information asymmetry 
while others are closely correlated with each other, and it also shows an 
insignificant relation with the expected stock returns. 
Choe and Yang (2007) January 1993 to December 2004 
PIN is not significantly priced while other measures for information risk are 
significantly priced. 
Park and Eom (2007) January 1997 to December 2005 
AdjPIN generally shows a significant relation with the expected stock returns 
while PIN does not. The original PIN model does not fit Korean stock 
market data, but is only useful for detecting the private-information risk that 
occurs during an extremely short period of time.  
Hwang, Lee, Lim, and Park (2013) January 2000 to December 2004 
AdjPIN is significantly related to the expected return, which is measured by 
the implied cost of equity, while PIN is not. 
Lai, Ng, and Zhang (2014) January 1997 to December 2010 
Both PIN and AdjPIN are not significantly priced in the international stock 
markets including the Korean stock market. 
Kang, Kwon, and Eom (2016) January 2001 to December 2006 The original PIN model does not fit to the Korean stock market data. 
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Table 2. Data specification 
This table presents a part of the intraday data on January 12th, 2004. Each row provides information about one transaction including a transaction price, 
number of shares traded, or the time the transaction completed. “B-A spread” indicates the bid-ask spread, and “Buyer (Seller) number” indicates the order 
submission number of the buyer (seller) of each transaction. 
Firm 
code 
Transaction 
time 
Date 
Bid 
price 
Ask 
price 
B-A 
spread 
Midpoint 
Buyer 
number 
Seller 
number 
Contraction 
number 
Number of 
shares 
Price Amount 
7160 32568.21 2004-01-12 3995 3935 60 3965 184 151 30 100 3995 399500 
7160 32979.86 2004-01-12 3935 3915 20 3925 185 276 72 30 3915 117450 
7160 32979.86 2004-01-12 3935 3915 20 3925 260 276 73 370 3915 1448550 
7160 33402.78 2004-01-12 3925 3920 5 3922.5 341 332 107 2030 3925 7967750 
7160 33402.79 2004-01-12 3950 3920 30 3935 341 302 108 100 3950 395000 
7160 33402.8 2004-01-12 3970 3920 50 3945 341 271 111 330 3970 1310100 
7160 33402.81 2004-01-12 3990 3920 70 3955 341 259 112 800 3990 3192000 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our data. Panel A shows the median and the percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution of a series of statistics 
on the daily number of buys and sells for each stock in the sample. Panel B shows the cross-sectional distribution of the estimated parameters of the adjusted 
PIN model along with the cross-sectional distribution of the estimated AdjPIN and PSOS in the adjusted PIN model. Panel C shows the summary statistics 
of monthly control variables. Beta is post-ranking beta estimated using 10 portfolios. log(ME) is the log of market value of firm equity from December of 
year t-1 and log(BM) is the log of book value divided by market value for year t-1. ILLIQ is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure calculated by annual 
average of daily price impact. The sample period is from 2001 to 2006. 
Panel A. Percentile of summary statistics on the number of buys and sells 
  95th percentile  75th percentile  Median  25th percentile  5th percentile 
Mean buys  9.41  5.09  3.15  1.76  0.74 
Mean sells  15.18  8.53  5.37  3.29  1.61 
Variance buys  248.26  89.85  36.84  11.97  1.75 
Variance sells  398.34  164.31  64.35  20.15  4.26 
Correlation between buys and sells  0.69  0.47  0.23  0.03  -0.29 
Panel B. Adjusted PIN model 
  95th percentile  75th percentile  Median  25th percentile  5th percentile 
𝑎   1.00  0.54  0.39  0.30  0.17 
𝑢𝑏  
 30.23  12.42  6.95  1.97  0.00 
𝑢𝑠  
 32.99  15.68  9.66  4.32  0.22 
𝑑   0.84  0.58  0.42  0.28  0.00 
𝜀𝑏  
 3.19  1.46  0.82  0.38  0.00 
𝜀𝑠  
 5.41  3.11  2.01  1.25  0.24 
𝜃   1.00  0.23  0.10  0.04  0.00 
𝜃′   0.53  0.27  0.18  0.11  0.00 
∆𝑏  
 32.19  16.06  8.42  1.48  0.00 
∆𝑠  
 42.61  21.64  10.66  2.30  0.00 
AdjPIN  0.59  0.44  0.38  0.30  0.19 
PSOS  0.44  0.34  0.27  0.21  0.12 
Panel C. Summary statistics of control variables 
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 ILLIQ log(ME) log(BM) Beta 
Mean 0.16 11.07 7.58 0.93 
Max 17.05 18.39 9.03 1.79 
Min 0.00 1.80 4.73 0.32 
Std. dev. 0.64 1.62 0.82 0.32 
Skewness 9.47 0.80 -0.75 0.70 
Kurtosis 130.97 1.06 0.32 0.27 
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Table 4. PIN and the cross-section of expected returns 
This table presents time series averages of the monthly cross-sectional regression. Beta is post-ranking beta estimated using 10 portfolios. log(ME) is the log 
of market value of firm equity from December of year t-1 and log(BM) is the log of book value divided by market value for year t-1. ILLIQ is the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure calculated by annual average of daily price impact. PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS are estimated for each calendar year. The sample 
period is from 2001 to 2006 and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Beta 0.807 0.731 1.028 1.126* 1.003 0.784 1.069 1.167* 1.043 
 (1.25) (1.15) (1.64) (1.79) (1.61) (1.22) (1.69) (1.83) (1.66) 
log(ME)  -0.088 -0.059 -0.063 -0.096 -0.066 -0.025 -0.037 -0.064 -0.040 
 (-0.50) (-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.55) (-0.38) (-0.14) (-0.21) (-0.35) (-0.22) 
log(BM)  0.724*** 0.775*** 0.725*** 0.679*** 0.717*** 0.785*** 0.735*** 0.685*** 0.728*** 
 (3.19) (3.49) (3.30) (3.04) (3.25) (3.48) (3.32) (3.06) (3.27) 
ILLIQ      1.064 0.902 1.001 0.898 
      (1.92) (1.68) (1.87) (1.65) 
PIN -0.571   -0.656    -0.939  
 (-0.50)   (-0.54)    (-0.76)  
AdjPIN  0.254   -0.785    -0.831 
  (0.27)   (-0.94)    (-0.94) 
PSOS   -2.930*** -2.937*** -3.233***  -2.740*** -2.744*** -3.059*** 
   (-3.04) (-2.91) (-3.37)  (-2.93) (-2.80) (-3.29) 
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Table 5. Correlations of PIN-related measures  
This table shows time series average of correlation between trading activity measures, PIN-related measures, and other control variables. log(ME) is the 
logarithm of market value of firm equity from December of year t-1, and log(BM) is the logarithm of book value divided by market value for year t-1. ILLIQ 
is Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure calculated by annual average of daily price impact. PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS are estimated for each calendar year. 
TURNOVER is calculated by annual average of daily turnover. The sample period is from 2001 to 2006 and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 PIN AdjPIN PSOS ILLIQ log(ME) log(BM) TURNOVER 
PIN 1 0.522*** 0.018 0.037 0.062 -0.006 -0.098 
  (6.03) (0.12) (0.36) (0.60) (-0.19) (-1.11) 
AdjPIN  1 -0.112 -0.034 0.040 0.015 -0.213* 
   (-0.46) (-0.41) (0.53) (0.44) (-1.97) 
PSOS   1 -0.179*** 0.031 -0.159** 0.399*** 
    (-3.18) (0.42) (-2.11) (8.50) 
ILLIQ    1 -0.204*** 0.080 -0.018 
     (-5.04) (1.09) (-0.88) 
log(ME)     1 -0.195 -0.416*** 
      (-1.38) (-8.13) 
log(BM)      1 -0.056 
       (-0.68) 
TURNOVER       1 
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Table 6. Trading activity on days with and without fair disclosure 
This table presents information about trading activity of each PSOS quintile on event days and non-event days. Event days are days with fair disclosure and 
non-event days are the remaining days. In each year t, we sort firms into quintiles based on the firms’ PSOS estimated in the previous year. For each quintile 
portfolio, we calculate the average of annual PIN-related measures, and then calculate average numbers of buys (BUYS) and sells (SELLS), average net order 
imbalance (IMB), average value of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (ILLIQ), and average value of turnover (TURNOVER) on event and non-event days, 
respectively. The sample period is from 2003 to 2006 and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less 
than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
PSOS quintile PSOS PIN AdjPIN 
BUYS SELLS IMB ILLIQ×100 TURNOVER×100 
non-event event non-event event non-event event non-event event non-event event 
1 0.084 0.449*** 0.412*** 6.2 7.6 9.9 8.9 -3.6 -1.3 0.075 0.030 0.012 0.014 
 (1.08) (3.58) (2.60) (0.25) (0.25) -(0.14) (0.12) (0.26) (0.50) (0.47) -(0.07) (0.21) (0.36) 
2 0.222*** 0.437*** 0.393*** 10.1 17.9 14.6 19.9 -4.5 -2.0 0.030 0.006 0.014 0.016 
 (5.66) (4.88) (5.03) (0.33) (0.33) -(0.13) (0.12) (0.28) (0.43) (0.48) -(0.05) (0.33) (0.28) 
3 0.281*** 0.415*** 0.363*** 12.4 21.9 18.6 28.8 -6.2 -6.9 0.022 0.006 0.015 0.014 
 (10.03) (4.78) (5.64) (0.35) (0.37) -(0.14) (0.09) (0.33) (0.42) (0.45) -(0.12) (0.11) (0.48) 
4 0.337*** 0.401*** 0.334*** 11.9 20.8 19.3 28.7 -7.3 -7.9 0.018 0.005 0.020 0.024 
 (13.06) (4.90) (6.27) (0.36) (0.38) -(0.19) (0.08) (0.32) (0.42) (0.46) -(0.14) (0.10) (0.36) 
5 0.435*** 0.402*** 0.288*** 12.7 20.3 23.5 32.6 -10.8 -12.3 0.024 0.007 0.038 0.044 
 (7.48) (4.13) (6.26) (0.38) (0.41) -(0.28) (0.08) (0.38) (0.51) (0.51) -(0.25) (0.22) (0.48) 
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Table 7. TURNOVER and the cross-section of expected returns 
This table presents time series averages of the monthly cross-sectional regression. Beta is post-ranking beta estimated using 10 portfolios. Log(ME) is the 
log of market value of firm equity from December of year t-1 and log(BM) is the log of book value divided by market value for year t-1. ILLIQ is Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure calculated by annual average of daily price impact. PSOS is estimated for each calendar year. TURNOVER is calculated by annual 
average of daily turnover. The AdjPSOS1 (AdjPSOS2) measure is an adjusted PSOS measure that is orthogonal to ILLIQ (TURNOVER). The sample period 
is from 2001 to 2006 and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Beta 0.931 1.000 1.029 0.980 0.796 0.865 
 (1.48) (1.60) (1.63) (1.57) (1.26) (1.36) 
log(ME) -0.207 -0.197 -0.172 -0.068 -0.042 -0.014 
 (-1.23) (-1.18) (-0.98) (-0.39) (-0.24) (-0.08) 
log(BM) 0.631*** 0.626*** 0.638*** 0.727*** 0.771*** 0.780*** 
 (3.10) (3.07) (3.11) (3.32) (3.43) (3.44) 
PSOS  -0.910 -0.883    
  (-1.02) (-0.99)    
ILLIQ   0.717   1.035* 
   (1.44)   (1.87) 
TURNOVER -0.249*** -0.226*** -0.215***    
 (-3.35) (-2.85) (-2.79)    
AdjPSOS1    -2.717***   
    (-2.93)   
AdjPSOS2     -1.087 -0.988 
     (-1.19) (-1.08) 
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Table 8. Correlations between daily buys and sells of three investor groups 
This table shows time series averages of correlation between buys and sells of three investor groups. nbuyi (nselli) means the number of buys (sells) of an 
investor group i (i=1, 2, 3). vbuyi (vselli) means the share volume of buys (sells) of an investor group i (i=1, 2, 3). Investor group 1, 2, and 3 indicate domestic 
institutional investor group, domestic individual investor group, and foreign investor group, respectively. Every day, we compute the correlation of daily 
buys and sells, then calculate the time series average of the correlation. The sample period is from 2001 to 2006. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 nsell1 nsell2 nsell3 vsell1 vsell2 vsell3 
nbuy1 0.121 0.024 0.083    
 (1.00) (0.37) (0.79)    
nbuy2 0.048 0.800*** 0.076    
 (0.52) (7.12) (0.64)    
nbuy3 0.086 0.060 0.120    
 (0.77) (0.60) (0.84)    
vbuy1    0.098 0.040 0.060 
    (0.65) (0.37) (0.52) 
vbuy2    0.071 0.722*** 0.124 
    (0.51) (4.18) (0.64) 
vbuy3    0.063 0.096 0.105 
    (0.53) (0.61) (0.63) 
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Table 9. Correlations of trading activity measures with key variables 
This table shows time series averages of correlation between trading activity measures, PIN-related measures, and other control variables. Log(ME) is the 
logarithm of market value of firm equity from December of year t-1 and log(BM) is the logarithm of book value divided by market value for year t-1. ILLIQ 
is Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure calculated by annual average of daily price impact. PIN, AdjPIN, and PSOS are estimated for each calendar year. RNTA, 
INTA, and FNTA are annual average of daily normalized trading activity of retail, institutional, and foreign traders, respectively. TURNOVER is calculated 
by annual average of daily turnover. The sample period is from 2001 to 2006, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a two-tailed test 
significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 INTA RNTA FNTA PIN AdjPIN PSOS ILLIQ log(ME) log(BM) TURNOVER 
INTA 1 0.067 0.060 0.040 -0.007 0.099*** -0.003 0.142 -0.057 0.116 
  (0.43) (0.74) (0.79) (-0.10) (3.41) (-0.03) (1.40) (-1.40) (0.74) 
RNTA  1 0.220 -0.100 -0.205* 0.388*** -0.017 -0.429*** -0.054 0.998*** 
   (0.67) (-1.21) (-1.78) (7.05) (-0.76) (-8.52) (-0.68) (14.09) 
FNTA   1 -0.070 -0.100 0.177* -0.106*** 0.129 -0.061 0.243 
    (-0.76) (-0.95) (1.88) (-2.74) (0.45) (-0.72) (0.73) 
 
 
33 
Table 10. Trading activity of three investor groups on days with and without fair disclosure 
This table presents information about trading activity of three investor groups for each PSOS quintiles on event days and non-event days. Event days are 
days with fair disclosure and non-event days are the remaining days. In each year t, we sort firms into quintiles based on the firms’ PSOS estimated in the 
previous year. For each quintile portfolio, we calculate each investor group’s average numbers of buys (BUYS) and sells (SELLS) on event and non-event 
days. 1, 2, and 3 are for institutional, individual, and foreign investor groups, respectively. The sample period is from 2003 to 2006 and t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
PSOS 
quintile 
BUYS1 SELLS1 BUYS2 SELLS2 BUYS3 SELLS3 
non-event event non-event event non-event event non-event event non-event event non-event event 
1 1.224 1.614 1.003 1.240 4.502 5.271 8.338 7.027 0.505 0.699 0.515 0.614 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.43) (0.22) (0.44) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.14) 
2 2.986 6.633 2.267 4.679 5.910 9.051 11.136 13.608 1.214 2.180 1.240 1.602 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.19) (0.24) (0.26) (0.35) (0.28) (0.40) (0.11) (0.22) (0.11) (0.21) 
3 3.237 6.835 2.814 5.929 7.600 11.990 14.208 19.544 1.527 3.071 1.567 3.346 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.18) (0.25) (0.28) (0.36) (0.32) (0.38) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.22) 
4 2.576 5.088 2.290 5.235 8.120 13.081 15.688 21.059 1.247 2.647 1.312 2.452 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.29) (0.37) (0.33) (0.39) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) 
5 1.063 2.586 1.064 2.676 10.943 16.513 21.584 27.797 0.704 1.151 0.822 2.096 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.12) (0.15) (0.35) (0.49) (0.39) (0.51) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) 
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Table 11. NTA measures and the cross-section of expected returns 
This table presents time series averages of the monthly cross-sectional regression. Beta is post-ranking beta estimated using 10 portfolios. Log(ME) is the 
log of market value of firm equity from December of year t-1 and log(BM) is the log of book value divided by market value for year t-1. ILLIQ is Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure calculated by annual average of daily price impact. PSOS is estimated for each calendar year. The AdjPSOS3 (AdjPSOS4) measure 
is an adjusted PSOS measure, which is orthogonal to INTA (RNTA). The sample period is from 2001 to 2006 and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Beta 0.729 0.790 0.759 1.054 0.944 1.047 1.061 0.959 
 (1.14) (1.24) (1.17) (1.68) (1.51) (1.66) (1.68) (1.52) 
log(ME) -0.034 -0.209 -0.087 -0.045 -0.172 -0.099 -0.040 0.005 
 (-0.20) (-1.32) (-0.50) (-0.26) (-1.14) (-0.57) (-0.22) (0.03) 
log(BM) 0.777*** 0.723*** 0.729*** 0.727*** 0.709*** 0.683*** 0.739*** 0.765*** 
 (3.49) (3.76) (3.32) (3.32) (3.57) (3.13) (3.33) (3.29) 
PSOS    -2.866*** -1.621 -2.496***   
    (-2.94) (-1.51) (-2.47)   
ILLIQ       0.903 0.989* 
       (1.68) (1.81) 
TURNOVER         
         
INTA -4.110*   -3.291     
 (-1.94)   (-1.49)     
RNTA  -0.638***   -0.478*    
  (-2.66)   (-1.82)    
FNTA   -5.315   -3.387   
   (-0.68)   (-0.44)   
AdjPSOS3       -2.620***  
       (-2.76)  
AdjPSOS4        -1.906* 
        (-1.79) 
 
